Turfan Mehmet Naim. The main object of the present essay is to prove the following thesis : that there has been a gradation from the military's pure de facto sense of authority to its de jure sense in the Turkish Republic. If we concern ourselves with something more than a description of a social institution, we cannot disregard the ideas, especially the legal and political ideas, as the raw material that helped to build it. For men respond, within the environment suitable for their existence in historic time, to changes in circumstances and movements of thought. This refers to the fact that there is a constant interplay between challenge and response in social, and within it particularly political, development.
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Turfan Mehmet Naim. The main object of the present essay is to prove the following thesis : that there has been a gradation from the military's pure de facto sense of authority to its de jure sense in the Turkish Republic.
If we concern ourselves with something more than a description of a social institution, we cannot disregard the ideas, especially the legal and political ideas, as the raw material that helped to build it. For men respond, within the environment suitable for their existence in historic time, to changes in circumstances and movements of thought. This refers to the fact that there is a constant interplay between challenge and response in social, and within it particularly political, development.
Hence, in dealing with, say, political development one has to take account of abstract concepts. Indeed, in the present argument, I approach my subject philosophically in that I want to enhance its linguistic clarity.
For I assume that language used to describe the "military's authority" will reflect conceptions of political reality. Now, concerning political reality, it is not always recognized that we continue to repeat generalizations about what we think we observe which bear precious little relation to what we know for ourselves. What indeed we think we observe, relating to the concept of "authority", has mainly derived from the observations of Thomas Hobbes.
It is true that Hobbes, that acute analyst of his unstable state and society, desired stability ; he wanted order. He was not the first to do so, nor was he likely to be the last thinker to comment upon the behaviour of men towards each other.
What he did was to make assumptions about the nature of man's social, and especially political, instincts and then to deduce from them a fairly comprehensive theory about how the state had evolved and how it should be run. This a priori deduction was, as he put it in the penultimate page of Leviathan , "occasioned by the disorders of the present time" Hobbes p. Hence, in dealing with such circumstances, whether the Levi athan did reduce all to "the condition of those who live under the Turk, the Muscovit, Prester John : and the Magol", as the Master of Southampton Grammar School, Alexander Rosse p.
And with the exception of the "Muscovit" has the value of historical or mythical conjecture. It is my view that although to date the most impressive treatise on political man to satisfy the mind has turned out to be Leviathan, it still cannot digest the fact that political man is not and has never been the apotheosis of rationality it assumed he was. Put bluntly, Leviathan does not help me much to see the mediaeval state as Hobbes saw it then.
What is does, however, is more useful than that. It supplies universal political concepts ; it enlarges and clarifies them as clear, consistent, coherent and helpful, as one would wish. The military is a human institution;. But rather than be drawn into the complexities of institutional politics, perhaps I should quote here a passage from Levi athan : "So that by Authority, is alwa-yes understood a Right of doing any act" Hobbes p.
It is evident, to me at least, that Hobbes presupposes a set of rules according to which certain individuals, indeed institutions, are authorised to do certain things and not to do other things. Thus, an institution may legitimately make whatever decisions it deems necessary, an individual issue whatever commands he deems commensurate with his status ; they both, as auctores assume auctoritas -as the progenitors, producers and imp!
This is what is generally called the de jure sense of authority. And it makes sense from where Hobbes stood. From my standpoint, however, "authority" in its pure de jure sense could safely be used only if I were to give criteria for its application such that one can at least formally identify what Gramsci called "the first element Yet when the emphasis on the concepts of political philosophy changes under the impact of political events, it comes to mean that the discussion is influenced by those very changes.
Simply because previously accepted notions require modification so that they can serve an immediate purpose ; in other words, they adjust themselves to the changes, they reflect the difference in emphasis on the concepts of political philosophy. Thus, new political realities can bring about a still newer philosophical interest and, more significantly, a justifiable reaction against merely the formal identification of the elements of politics -a kind of reaction that will prompt how, in the first place, formal identification is conferred.
This will require, for instance, a perspective beyond the concept of rule-conferred authority. It is possible then for a phenomenon to emerge that combines a de jure sense of authority with its primordial i ty -in other words, its de facto sense. Only this sense of authority can do justice to its primary function -the clearest expression of which is found in Bertrand de Jouvenel :.
Society in fact exists only because man is capable of proposing and of affecting by his proposals another's dispositions What I mean by 'authority' is the ability of a man to get his own proposals accepted. Authority in a de facto sense in fact has always existed since man began inducing other men to do what he told them, convincing them that they ought, regardless of the reason for so doing.
Thus, de Jouvenel 's original insistence that de facto authority is essential to the forward march of every society and indeed to the very existence of society vivifies the idea that political order is an essential condition. The characterization of this idea has a certain circular quality in establishing the landmarks between freedom and authority.
And in a passage of the "Introduction" to The right to heresy we find Stefan Zweig doing just this : "In the absence of authority, liberty degenerates into licence, and chaos ensues ;. All this is preliminary to my central argument. The present exposition on the two facets of authority are almost overfamiliar to contemporary political philosophers see esp.
Peters and Benn The inescapable conclusion of their argument is that the notion of authority forms a philosophical compound. Peter s' comment on this is : "The de jure sense of 'authority' proclaims that a man has a right to be an auctor ; the de facto sense states that he is a matter of fact one" p. The crux, then, of Peters' position is his contention that the concept of "authority11 can be used in a de jure and a de facto sense.
And the central task to which political philosophers like himself have addressed themselves is that of the nature of de facto authority most commonly arising from de jure authority. Moreover, that Peters is clearly both justifying the direction and affirming the validity of this type of justification cannot be doubted in the light of the passage which follows : "There is a gradation from the pure de jure sense of 'authority' Peters p.
It is the universality of this contention that I wish to deny. Indeed, in this essay I am concerned, by the analysis of a representati ve example, to propound an entirely opposite thesis about this gradation. Authority, in fact, is a recurrent social concept which does break free from institutional ethnocentri sm. Nor am I faced here with a concept in the form of a novel substance.
I am not. In this context the idea of authority, albeit. It can be. Thus it retains relevance to reality. However, it is probably evident from these somewhat bold claims and statements that the immediate questions "Under what conditions has there been a gradation from the mi 1 i tary İ5 pure de facto sense of authority to its de jure sense in the Turkish Republic? In what then does the problem consist? And to which stage of Turkish history can the delineation of the problem be thus attained?
These are all questions about whose answers it is easy to be mistaken unless I pay sufficient attention to the significance of events following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire : one aim of what follows will be to present the military aspects which must be emphasized before we can settle such questions. With a reality so conceived, in its outward manifestations and its final effects the Ottoman dissolution would no doubt seem to have been primarily a military event.
No doubt it was so, in that it had military repercussions, significantly, in the forcible divorcing of the Ottoman military from its accepted role as the ultimate arbiter of political activity. Here, it would not be irrelevant to mention that this type of arbitrament comprised the political ruling group role, in. Once created, it had become acceptable to the civilians and, more importantly, to the soldiers themselves.
And indeed soldiers were compelled to believe that their conduct conformed to that role. The military profession saw itself as an expression of Ottoman society. Then, as with the officers, so it was with the military institution which cemented the corps of officers together in such a way that it achieved a sort of separate personality. Thus, the political identity of such a distinguished personality expressed itself in the various forms of its conscious political acts, the most distinguishable of which, at the risk of repetition, was the military's playing of the political ruling group role.
It is, of course, this primordial political compulsion which pointed the way to an understanding of the dominant behaviour of the officers. Accordingly, whenever individual organizations or autonomous groups tried to assume, or succeeded in assuming, political power with the purpose of emancipating the Ottoman state from the predominance of the officer corps, the officers reasserted their predominance.
Equally, when the defeat and the subsequent occupation of her remaining key territories placed the Ottomans' major institutions under Entente control , the officer corps perceived the foreign presence as the prime cause of the eradication of their predominance.
They immediately commenced to identify themselves with the destiny of the Turkish nation which they were convinced of their vocation to save, a vocation sanctioned by their uniform. I argue, therefore, that just as it was in times of domestic turmoil and continuing menace during the Second Constitutional Period, in the face of the post-War victors' duplicity and subsequent invasion the military was the primary and directing influence in organizing a nucleus for the reestablishment of order in the chaos.
In essence, starting from the middle of November , the Entente commanders overturned the superstructure which past history had promoted. Milne, "Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea and Allied Forces in Asia Minor" -to name but one of the top Entente commanders who were empowered to interpret and to enforce the terms of the Mondros Mudros Armistice of 30 October toward the total dismemberment of the Empire or rather, what remained of it by collusion or by coercion, by occupation or by invasion, directly or by proxy.
Now, while there can be no question but that this prol i feration of conflict was vitally significant for the future, for the time being, more significantly, the victors had as a result simply substituted one political ruling group role for another : more uncompromising in its conception, less binding in its moral claim, in many ways as authori tari an in its character and, to a marked degree, maintained by malevolent will and dissimilar force. This kind of conclusion the historians have all too seldom brought to our attention.
Yet it is a valid conclusion, so it will be said. But this is not enough. What matters more for us is that the first, formal, occupation of Istanbul 13 November by armada was the last critical stage in the dismemberment of the Empire. The Allies, in breaking down the social continuity, had certainly effected an inherent and indeed potential antagonism in the society. Then, this meant only one thing : that an insulating gap had opened between the superstructure military and the basis society so that the society, under the prevailing influence of its dominant constituent, the living Turkish military tradition, could not consciously allow the military to atrophy, to lapse into desuetude.
Nor would the officers, with a heightened consciousness of their past and a clearer insight into economical, political and psychological motives set in motion long ago and which still controlled them, let themselves be dislodged from the position they had occupied in the social order. From the beginning. And neither of them could escape the immediate decision that then confronted both soldier and will, one way or another : namely, whether he would devote his resources to regaining the position he had once held or would yield to the then almost al 1 -pervading alien forces he himself had unwittingly kindled.
The first choice entailed a fight to the finish for, of course, armed aggression required armed resistance -a violent reaction for which no other conceivable force in the Ottoman realm but the regular military could provide effective initiative and, indeed, execution. What, however, this involved fundamentally was the transferal, yet again, of the zimam-i idare from the hands of their current holders, the Allies, back to those of that disciplined force which always had and now, in fact, would once more provide the effective initiative ; this could only be the military.
And only in this way, certain in the belief of their own indispensabil ity in the life of the nation, could the officers develop their own social capacity to the full, making sure that their voice was heard in the discussion of what they considered to be the problem of "national liberation".
He and his fellow officers mostly believed this postulate to be central to the conduct, more precisely to the perception, of national liberation. For national liberation to succeed, therefore, the military had to be indi visibly loyal to it. AnJ to be loyal it had to be resolute. From the perspective of the officers, then, the very outcome and, more importantly, the aftermath of the "liberation" depended tfpon the military acting as the ultimate arbiter.
Its quality was attributed to both men and materiel, but first arid foremost to men -reliance upon whom forms the fundamental tenet of Turkish military thinking.
If this is how we should discern the gist of the İstiklal Harbi War of Independence , as the Turks came to call it, the Turkish military tradition that keeps on reflecting the predominance of the Turkish military seems fully ascertained. Because there was a good reason then for officers to be cast in.
The two notions of "national liberation" and "armed resistance" were an exclusive and sublime prerogative assigned to the military. The salvation of our motherland until now has been assured by them.
But in future, the securing of existence of the motherland will truly be dependent on them. When the two notions of "national liberation" and "armed resistance" had been recognized and defined as something inherent in the military's nature, their action was to establish their de facto authority by causing the soldiers' voice to be heard above the will and settled custom of the civilians.
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