COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE BY DAVID GALULA PDF

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However, it has recently fallen into disfavor and become one of the most maligned works as well. Army Field Manual FM , Counterinsurgency , and the equally controversial notion of population-centric counterinsurgency. One thing that General David Petraeus was adept at was controlling a situation. When he was the Commander of the Combined Arms Center CAC at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which included the Command and General Staff College CGSC , he saw an opportunity not only to begin building a team to help him construct counterinsurgency doctrine, but also an opportunity to educate mid-level officers on counterinsurgency.

Critics of Galula offer equally flaccid reasoning and argumentation. Many opponents of population-centric warfare have become disenchanted with Galula for the wrong reasons. Most point to either the historically narrow viewpoint from which Galula views counterinsurgency, or his overemphasis on non-kinetic counterinsurgency practices. The first criticism is ridiculous for, if taken to its logical extreme, almost nothing written on counterinsurgency has any value for current and future counterinsurgents since all thinkers on the subject write in the confines of the period in which they live and are colored by their own experiences.

The second criticism is patently false and this myth will be debunked presently. The importance of the insurgent cause, too, cannot be understated. One of the most important observations Galula offers is his theory regarding the two paths an insurgency can take. The goal for the insurgent is to cause as much fear as possible in the general public in order to create a crisis of legitimacy for the central government.

If the people begin to feel the government cannot protect them, then the insurgents will have an easier time inculcating some of their other claims of government ineptness. Both types, and, in fact, Galula argues all types, are vulnerable early on in what has come to be known as the proto-insurgent phase. When the insurgency is just beginning, attempting to gather strength around a developing cause, the counterinsurgent can step in harshly and apply some draconian measures to destabilize the leadership, dissuade membership, and disrupt communications which will all but ensure that a proto-insurgency cannot develop into a full blown insurgency.

This is best exemplified in the recent Iranian cases where, despite massive violations of human rights, the Iranian oligarchy was able to cruelly crush the proto-insurgent democracy movement. The shortcut or terrorist pattern is most vulnerable early on especially when transitioning to selective terrorism but then experiences a sharp decline in vulnerability even through the guerilla and movement phases.

The orthodox pattern is most vulnerable in the transitioning phases from guerilla to movement. This is due to the fact that when the orthodox insurgents transition from guerilla tactics they open themselves up as visible targets.

If the insurgent has not garnered enough conventional power and the counterinsurgent still has the will and material to prosecute effective maneuver warfare, then the insurgents could be setting themselves up for a route. Such an incident recently played out in Sri Lanka where the long-time insurgency of the Tamil Tigers was almost completely destroyed by conventional forces when they began acquiring small ships, planes, and artillery, and they attempted to transition to more conventional fighting.

David Galula does emphasize the importance of people in counterinsurgency warfare but people matter in any form of warfare.

He offers some novel non-kinetic ways for diffusing the insurgency, mainly through undermining the cause. In one case, he simply argues the counterinsurgent should make a list of the insurgent grievances and comply with as many as possible. But Galula is not the population-centric, non-kinetic, hearts and minds advocate that the proponents of this modern counterinsurgency model want him to be. He devoted a lot of his research to finding the vulnerabilities in different types of movement to kinetic action.

Ultimately, it is in this way that Galula offers much for everyone to use in a counterinsurgency fight. Dan G. He is interested in systems thinking, operational art, strategy, and anticipating the future of conflict. He is currently working on a book anticipating future pandemic shocks and their implications tentatively entitled Breaking Point. Before you download your free e-book, please consider donating to support open access publishing. E-IR is an independent non-profit publisher run by an all volunteer team.

Your donations allow us to invest in new open access titles and pay our bandwidth bills to ensure we keep our existing titles free to view. Any amount, in any currency, is appreciated. Many thanks! Donations are voluntary and not required to download the e-book - your link to download is below. Submissions Advertise Donate About. Review — Counterinsurgency Warfare Dan G. Cox , May 11 , views. Download PDF. More from E-International Relations. Interview - William I. Interview - Holger Stritzel.

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Find out about our effort to help us all think through what we can do to help. He begins this task by describing the basic characteristics of revolutionary war in general, because an insurgency along with revolution and coup d'etat is thought to be a type of revolutionary warfare. While a revolution is a sudden and "accidental" mass movement and a plot or coup is an intentional effort to overthrow the top leadership in a swift action, an insurgency is intentional, but not swift. It is a protracted struggle conducted methodically in order to attain intermediary goals with an eventual aim of overthrowing the existing power structure. While the book is primarily concerned with insurgency, it often refers to both revolutions and plots as well. A key characteristic of all three types of revolutionary warfare is their inherent asymmetry. Counterinsurgents hold a virtual monopoly on tangible assets, such as material resources and legitimate power.

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Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

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Summary of "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice"

Would you like to tell us about a lower price? If you are a seller for this product, would you like to suggest updates through seller support? This volume in the Praeger Security International PSI series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era defines the laws of insurgency and outlines the strategy and tactics to combat such threats. Drawn from the observations of a French officer, David Galula, who witnessed guerrilla warfare on three continents, the book remains relevant today as American policymakers, military analysts, and members of the public look to the counterinsurgency era of the s for lessons to apply to the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. With a new foreword by John A. Read more Read less. Frequently bought together.

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Counterinsurgency Warfare : Theory and Practice

However, it has recently fallen into disfavor and become one of the most maligned works as well. Army Field Manual FM , Counterinsurgency , and the equally controversial notion of population-centric counterinsurgency. One thing that General David Petraeus was adept at was controlling a situation. When he was the Commander of the Combined Arms Center CAC at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which included the Command and General Staff College CGSC , he saw an opportunity not only to begin building a team to help him construct counterinsurgency doctrine, but also an opportunity to educate mid-level officers on counterinsurgency.

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